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Abstract. This paper addresses scenarios and security issues when migrating SCADA 
systems to cloud and fog environments. Migration strategies to the cloud refer to different 
cloud infrastructures (public, private or hybrid) as well as selection of cloud service. 
Benefits of cloud-based SCADA systems mainly refer to improving economic efficiency. 
We further address migration risks, with regards to quality of service and cyber security. 
Challenges in security provisioning encompass security solutions, risk management and 
test environment. Finally, we address emerging evolution of SCADA toward fog 
computing, including the three-tier system’s architecture and security issues. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With respect to the earlier version [1], presented at the 4th Virtual International Conference 
on Science, Technology and Management in Energy – eNergetics 2018, this paper is extended 
with more thorough considerations related to cyber security when migrating Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems into cloud computing environment, and 
discussion on the evolution toward fog computing system architecture. 
In the past few years, the focus of cloud computing has progressively shifted from 
consumer applications toward corporate control systems. The migration of applications, 
such as SCADA, into the cloud environment is interesting for business users due to 
potential reduction of costs, scalability, efficient system configuration and maintenance. 
Access and lease of resources are on-demand, with costs that are much lower than buying, 
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installing and maintaining the hardware and software, and with decreasing the number of 
technical staff. 
The industrial sector is experiencing substantial benefits from using the Industrial 
Internet of Things (IIoT) to automate systems, deploy different types of sensors, improve 
efficiency, and increase revenue opportunities. The amount of data from such industrial 
systems can be measured in the millions of gigabytes. Traditional information technology 
(IT) cannot fulfill requirements regarding data analysis, delay, mobility, reliability, 
security, privacy, and network bandwidth. Fog computing seems to be a promising 
solution to resolve such problems. Particularly, fog computing outperforms cloud 
computing for delay-sensitive applications with stringent security requirements. 
Apart from industry efforts [2–5], only a few academic research papers systematically 
explored SCADA systems using cloud and/or fog environments, and particularly the 
related security issues. 
Our primary motivation for this work was to provide an in-depth insight into migration 
of advanced SCADA systems to both cloud and fog environments, with focus to security 
as a crucial risk factor in the context of critical infrastructure. The main objectives of this 
review paper are: (1) to discuss security issues of cloud-based SCADA systems, regarding 
different migration strategies and types of cloud services; (2) to consider SCADA security 
solutions and challenges in security provisioning in the cloud environment and (3) to 
explore SCADA evolution toward fog computing system architecture, with special 
concern to security. Finally, we identify gaps in current research and propose relevant 
research priorities for future work in the area. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical 
background, regarding operation principles of SCADA systems, as well as basic concepts 
of cloud and fog computing. In Section 3, we first explain migration strategies of SCADA 
systems to the cloud, with respect to different cloud infrastructures and selection of cloud 
service. Further, benefits and risks of cloud-based SCADA systems are explained, as well 
as challenges in cloud security provisioning in terms of security solutions, risk 
management and test environments. Section 4 considers evolution toward fog computing 
system architecture, including migration of SCADA systems to fog, and security issues. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. SCADA System: Architecture, Configuration and Protocols 
SCADA systems are a class of industrial control systems that control and monitor 
geographically dispersed process equipment in a centralized manner. They are widely 
used in the industrial sectors like electric power systems, oil refineries and natural gas 
distribution, water and wastewater treatment, and transportation systems.  
Fig. 1 presents layered architecture of a SCADA system, with common components 
and configuration. Hierarchy of SCADA system is defined according to interconnection 
of its components and their connectivity with external networks [6–8]. The lowest layer 0 
represents physical devices that are in direct interaction with industrial hardware, 
interconnected via fieldbus. 
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Fig. 1 The layered architecture of a SCADA system 
Controllers at layer 1 process signals from field devices and generate appropriate 
commands for these devices. They encompass remote terminal units (RTUs), programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs) and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that perform local control 
of actuators and sensor monitoring. 
Processing results are forwarded to control center at layer 2 for further analysis and 
response control. Supervisory network connects SCADA server (Master Terminal Unit, 
MTU), historian server, engineering work stations, human machine interface (HMI) server 
and consoles, as well as communication devices, such as routers, switches or modems. 
Control center collects and analyzes information obtained from field sites, presents them on 
the HMI consoles, and generates actions based on detected events. Control center is also 
responsible for general alarms, analysis of trends and generating the reports. Communication 
subsystem connects control center with field sites and allows operators remote access to field 
sites for diagnostic and failures repairing purposes. It also connects control center with 
SCADA partner plants. 
Layer 3 typically represents demilitarized zone (DMZ), where application servers, 
historian server and domain controller are located. Layer 4 corresponds to the corporate 
IT network, which is connected to the Internet. 
Modern SCADA systems are based on open communication standards, such as Ethernet, 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite and a variety of wireless 
standards. A set of standard or proprietary protocols are used for communications, over point-
to-point links or a broadband IP-based wide area network (WAN). There are several standard 
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and vendor-specific SCADA communication protocols, and the most widespread are 
Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), IEC 60870-5 series and IEC 61850 series 
used for electrical substation automation systems. Most of these protocols are designed or 
extended to operate over TCP/IP networks. Besides, most of the existing fieldbus protocols 
are based on Ethernet technology. A comprehensive review of SCADA protocols can be 
found in [9] and [10]. 
2.2. Cloud Computing: Basics and Security Issues 
According to [11], cloud computing is defined as "a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction". 
Public cloud infrastructure is owned by a provider and sold as a service to business and 
residential users. Private cloud refers to an infrastructure that is owned or leased by a 
business user (single organization). Hybrid cloud infrastructure is a combination of private 
and public cloud infrastructures, which remain mutually independent and connected by 
standard or proprietary technology that enables portability of data and applications. 
Service architecture of a cloud computing system is hierarchically structured [12]:  
 The lowest, hardware layer at the data center actually consists of the physical 
hardware devices including the processor, memory, storage and bandwidth. 
 The infrastructure layer assumes the virtualization to provide the Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS), which usually consists of a pool of virtual machines (VMs) 
that can be provisioned on demand to the IT consumers. 
 The platform layer enables creation and development of software, which can be 
later delivered over the Web. Hence, this layer provides the Platform as a Service 
(PaaS) by utilizing the components and services of the infrastructure layer. 
 The highest, software layer provides the ready-to-use software and applications for 
the business needs of the cloud service customers. Hence, this layer facilitates and 
provides the Software as a Service (SaaS) by utilizing the components and 
services of the platform layer. 
Besides security threats that are present in the existing computing platforms and 
networks, cloud computing faces a number of additional vulnerabilities [13]. They 
include: (1) attacks by other customers; (2) shared technology issues; (3) failures in 
provider or customer security systems; (4) flawed integration of provider and customer 
security systems; (5) insecure application programming interfaces; (6) data loss or leakage 
and (7) account or service hijacking. 
In particular, susceptibilities depend on the type of cloud service. In general, IaaS is 
susceptible to all of the threats that are well known from the traditional information and 
communication environment [14]. All of the client applications running on the virtual 
machines are like "black boxes" for the provider. In other words, the customer is 
responsible for securing these applications. PaaS is particularly susceptible to shared 
technology issues, because security settings may differ for various kinds of resources. 
Another problem caused by shared resources refers to data leakage. Finally, protection of 
user objects is one of the most serious issues of PaaS [15]. Since SaaS requires only a 
Web browser and the internet connection, its security aspects are similar to the Web 
service [16]. SaaS is susceptible to data security, and particularly to their confidentiality. 
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The other common problems with data security include data backup, data access, storage 
locations, availability, authentication, etc. 
Table 1 summarizes the attacks types and their impacts, regarding layered cloud 
service architecture and emphasizes responsibilities of cloud service provider (CSP).  
Table 1 Types of attacks on the cloud and their impacts (adapted from [16]) 
Security 
issues 
Attack types Impacts CSP 
responsibility 
SaaS PaaS IaaS 
Software 
layer 
SQL injection attacks, cross 
site scripting 
Modification of data, 
confidentiality, session hijacking 
   
Platform 
layer 
Domain Name System attacks, 
sniffing, reuse of IP address 
Traffic flow analysis, exposure in 
network security 
   
Infrastructure 
layer 
DoS and DDoS, VM escape, 
hypervisor rootkit 
Software interruption and 
modification, programming flaws 
   
Hardware 
layer 
Phishing attacks, 
malware injection attack 
Limited access to data centers, 
hardware modification and theft 
   
2.3. Fog Computing: Basics and Security Issues 
Fog computing is a decentralized network architecture in which data storage, processing 
and applications are distributed in the most efficient way between the data source and the 
cloud. Fog computing and cloud computing show similar characteristics in terms of 
computation, storage and networking technologies. However, the most important difference 
of fog computing is its close distance to end users. This property is essential to support 
delay-sensitive applications and services. Another difference refers to support of big data by 
means of edge analytics and stream mining. Finally, location-awareness property enables 
mobility support. Comprehensive surveys on fog computing, including applications in the 
electric power industry, can be found in [17] and [18]. 
Another benefit of fog computing is its high security because data is processed by a large 
number of nodes in a distributed system. However, including the virtualization just like cloud, 
fog environment can still be affected by the similar threats. As opposed to cloud computing, 
standard security certifications and measures still do not exist for the fog computing. 
Stojmenovic and Wen first explored security and privacy issues in the fog computing 
environment [19]. A more detailed review of fog security solutions can be found in [20].  
3. CLOUD-BASED SCADA SYSTEMS: MIGRATION, BENEFITS AND RISKS 
3.1. Migration of SCADA Systems to Cloud  
Cloud computing provides support for SCADA applications in two ways [3]: 
1. SCADA application is executed on premises (company, organization, etc.). It is 
directly connected with control center and transfers data to the cloud where they 
can be stored and distributed. 
2. SCADA application is completely executed in the cloud, and is remotely connected 
to the control center. 
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The first method, presented in Fig. 2, is more widely used. Control functions of SCADA 
application are isolated in the controller network, while SCADA application is connected to 
cloud services that allow visualization of processes, reports and remote access. Such 
applications are usually implemented on a public cloud infrastructure. 
Implementation illustrated in Fig. 3 is suitable for distributed SCADA applications. 
Controllers are connected via WAN links to SCADA application that is executed in the 
cloud. Such applications are usually implemented on private and hybrid cloud infrastructures.  
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Fig. 2 Public cloud infrastructure, with SCADA system operating on-premises  
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Fig. 3 Private or hybrid cloud infrastructure where controllers are connected via WAN 
links to SCADA application that is executed in the cloud 
Regarding service selection, there are three possible migration scenarios of SCADA 
system to the cloud, namely the re-hosting, refactoring and revising [21]. 
The first scenario (re-hosting) is the fastest and the simplest, and represents installing 
the existing SCADA applications to cloud environment, based on IaaS. This is the first 
step of the gradual migration, that allows analysis and, if needed, extension of the 
applications, through several iterations. 
The second and the third scenarios assume re-engineering to better benefit from the 
features of cloud computing, primarily in terms of scalability and reliability. This can be a 
simple modification of particular features (refactoring). An example is implementation of 
resource control capabilities that allows adding additional resources when the application 
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is intensively used and releasing resources when they are not needed. Larger modifications at 
the application core are also possible (revising). An example is the use of PaaS database for 
modification of application in such a way that multi-tenancy SaaS offering is possible. The 
increase of the number of SaaS offers requires the replacement of the existing SCADA 
applications with cloud-based SaaS solutions. 
3.2. Benefits and Risks  
There are several advantages of cloud computing that motivate users to migrate to cloud-
based SCADA system. 
With public cloud, access and lease of resources are on-demand, at a much lower price 
than purchasing, installing and maintaining company's own software and hardware. 
Consequently, the number of technical staff, needed for IT resource maintaining, decreases. 
According to [3], cloud-based SCADA solution can reduce end-user costs up to 90% over a 
traditional SCADA system. 
Scalability is enhanced, since there is no need for purchasing and installing server farm, 
databases, Web servers, when more resources are needed. Users can easily purchase 
additional resources on a virtual cloud server, with no need of installing and maintaining the 
additional hardware [3]. 
Information located on a cloud server can be accessed from anywhere; hence, the 
collaboration on projects is more efficient due to easier access to information.  
Upgrade of existing and implementation of new applications is simplified through re-
hosting, refactoring and revising [21]. 
With private cloud, efficient resource usage, reduced energy consumption and efficient 
maintenance enable faster upgrade, business continuity, rapid deployment of new services 
and overall cost reduction [22]. 
Despite the aforementioned benefits, there are two serious risk factors for cloud-based 
SCADA systems, quality of service (QoS) and cyber security, which will be considered in 
the following subsections. 
3.2.1. QoS Requirements  
QoS refers to system’s performance, as well as reliability and availability. Most of the 
industrial applications pose stringent performance requirements regarding delay, packet loss 
and bandwidth. The most stringent requirements for delay are in the fieldbus and controller 
networks. Response times are in the range of 250 microseconds to 1 millisecond, while for less 
demanding processes they are in the range of 1 to 10 milliseconds [9]. Upper layers have 
progressively less stringent delays, typically up to 1 second. Industrial applications also assume 
highly reliable network infrastructure with service availability higher than 99.98% [23]. 
The use of public cloud services increases the risk that these requirements will not be met, 
because the user cannot control the network performance. Increased and unpredictable delay is 
challenging, since it can block the real-time SCADA operation. 
Church et al. presented a case study on migration of a SCADA system to the IaaS cloud 
[21]. They analyzed several open source SCADA applications and applied re-hosting approach 
to migrate SCADA application to a real academic network. Performance evaluation has 
shown that delay introduced by the cloud-based SCADA system was not a limiting factor. 
Measured response times were in the range from several hundreds of milliseconds to one 
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second. However, problems emerged with polling protocols (e.g., Modbus TCP), which 
are based on individual polls of remote stations. Applying event-driven communication 
protocols seems to be more efficient solution, because of reducing both delay and amount 
of data sent across a network. If such a solution is not possible and polling protocols have 
to be applied, field devices should be spread across several remote servers. 
Before migration of a SCADA system to the public cloud, the following questions 
should be answered [2, 3]: 
 What are the consequences of variable QoS on the industrial process controlled by 
a particular SCADA system? 
 What is the impact of increased delay and delay variation on SCADA system?  
 What is the upper bound for delay in each system’s part? For example, increased 
delay is not critical at the upper layers, which perform monitoring and reporting.   
The problems of availability and reliability exist in every system in the public cloud. The 
servers are placed in unknown locations that users cannot access. The data of SCADA systems 
encompass results of the industrial process control in real time; therefore, the loss of 
functionality, even for a few seconds, can cause serious consequences to the industrial process.  
The situation is different with private cloud infrastructure. Chen et al. conducted a study 
on private cloud-based electric power SCADA system [22]. Their experimental results 
indicated technical feasibility of the professional private cloud solution; such a system meets 
the actual need of power grid operations, and some QoS parameters such as network load 
rate are even better than those of the traditional IT architecture.   
3.2.2. Security Issues  
The security issue of the hard real-time system requires overall analysis and holistic 
understanding of network protection, management theory and physical systems. This 
problem is getting even more complex in the case of migration to the cloud. 
Cyber attacks on SCADA systems can be categorized into: hardware attacks, software 
attacks and communication stack attacks [24]. SCADA control center performs its actions 
based on the data received from RTUs. Attacks that jeopardize process control focus on 
modifying control data or blocking the data transfer. Primary threats to SCADA systems are 
command/response injection, various forms of denial of service (DoS) attacks, including 
distributed DoS (DDoS), and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [25, 26]. 
Cloud-based SCADA systems suffer from the same cyber security risks (indicated in 
Section 2.2) as the other systems integrated into cloud [27]. Still, there are a number of 
threats in the public cloud environment that might make SCADA systems more vulnerable. 
First, cloud-based SCADA systems are more exposed to cyber threats such as 
command/response injection, DoS/DDoS attacks, and MITM attack. This comes as a 
consequence of sharing an infrastructure with unknown outside parties [3].  
Second, network connections between SCADA systems and the cloud potentially 
increase the risk of jeopardizing the whole industrial control systems by outside attackers 
[27, 28]. 
Third, some of SCADA-specific application layer protocols lack protection [4, 27]. For 
instance, the most widespread SCADA protocols, Modbus and DNP3, do not support 
authentication and encryption. 
Finally, the use of commercial off-the-shelf solutions (instead of proprietary ones) 
potentially increases the cyber security risk [27].  
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3.3. Security Solutions 
According to [28], security solutions concerning public cloud infrastructure should 
address the challenges related to:  
 Information input; 
 Information and command output;  
 Shared storage and computational resources and  
 Shared physical infrastructure. 
Regarding information input/output, it is essentially important not to expose the critical, 
control infrastructure to the Internet. For that reason, when using public cloud infrastructure, 
push technology should be utilized to move data to the cloud rather than pull technology. Thus, 
there are no open network ports on the control infrastructure, while SCADA applications 
remain isolated in the controller network. 
Concerning shared storage and computational resources, SCADA utility interacting with a 
CSP should be aware how the computational resources are managed for different applications 
running in the cloud, including guarantees for resource allocation and network access, service 
levels, fault-tolerance strategy, etc.  
Finally, security of shared physical infrastructure refers to secure cloud infrastructure 
locations, communication links connecting the cloud infrastructure to the rest of the 
communications infrastructure, ability to inspect and audit the locations from which SCADA 
application will be served, etc.  
Consequently, when selecting the CSP and assessing maturity of the offered cloud service, 
the following criteria should be taken into account [4]: 
 Ensuring secure user access. 
 Mutual isolation of information originating from different applications. 
 Determining the level of users control regarding changes of the CSP infrastructure.  
 Data encryption. 
 Automated distribution of software patches. 
 Provisioning scheduled and unscheduled reports that satisfy business needs. 
 Continuous monitoring, which includes assessment of security mechanisms efficiency in 
near real-time. 
 Continuous analysis of events, incidents, suspicious activities and anomalies.  
 Capabilities to create and analyze log files, to detect intrusions in real-time, to 
generate responses to detected attacks. 
 Readiness to take immediate corrective actions of all vulnerabilities identified.  
 Consistent and reliable customer service. 
The most efficient way to protect SCADA system connected to the public cloud is to 
establish precise service level agreement (SLA) that fulfills the aforementioned criteria. 
Similar research, regarding enterprise resource planning, pointed out the importance of 
introducing SLAs in the context of using SaaS and open-source software [29]. 
SCADA protection is much simpler in private cloud, since security solutions are 
responsibility of the network owner. It is recommended to apply a strategy known as 
"defense-in-depth", i.e., a multilayer security architecture that minimizes the impact of a 
failure in any one layer mechanism [30]. This strategy assumes corresponding security 
policies, employing DMZ network architecture to prevent direct traffic between the 
corporate and SCADA networks, as well as security mechanisms such as smart access 
control, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, antivirus software, deploying 
security patches on a regular basis, etc. 
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In hybrid cloud, using secured virtual private network (VPN) connection to the control 
infrastructure is strongly recommended [28]. 
3.4. Risk Management 
Security risk management is a cyclic process that encompasses several phases: risk analysis 
through identification of vulnerabilities and threats, risk assessment, making decisions on 
acceptable risk level, selection and implementation of measures to mitigate the risk. 
Risk assessment is the most important phase in the risk management process, but also most 
susceptible to errors. According to [30], risk assessment is "the process of identifying risks to 
operations, assets, or individuals by determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting 
impact, and additional security controls that would mitigate this impact". 
Different qualitative and quantitative approaches, methods and tools for risk assessment 
in industrial control environment can be found in the literature. Two comprehensive reviews 
of risk assessment methods for SCADA systems have been published only recently [31, 32]. 
However, none of the reviewed methods considers cloud-based SCADA. Hence, significant 
research efforts are needed to address this important issue, because risk management takes 
the outputs of the risk assessment process to consider the options for risk mitigation and finding 
the trade-offs among overall costs, benefits, and risks of SCADA migration to the cloud. 
3.5. Test Environments 
Due to need to support the operational continuity, it is often unfeasible to perform security 
experiments on a real SCADA system. Hence, proper test environments should be developed, 
consisting of testbeds, datasets and simulated attacks. While test environments for SCADA in 
traditional IP-based networks have gained certain level of maturity, research work is still 
needed regarding cloud-based SCADA systems. 
SCADA security testbed can be implemented as: (1) a single software simulation package; 
(2) laboratory testbed, which may have several interacting simulations and (3) emulation or 
implementation-based, which uses emulator or real hardware [8]. In the context of cloud-based 
SCADA, probably the most valuable option will be laboratory testbeds that allow other 
researchers to repeat the experiments and validate their own upgraded solutions. Such testbeds 
should be built on the top of some of the general-purpose cloud simulators, which interact with 
domain specific models or real world field devices. Some examples of such simulators are 
CloudSim, GreenCloud, CloudAnalyst, iCanCloud and EMUSIM [33]. 
Due to confidentiality of real SCADA network data, researchers often use synthetic datasets 
or datasets obtained from SCADA testbeds. This is a general problem in verifying security 
solutions for SCADA systems. Besides synthetic datasets, there is a strong need to use datasets 
from real SCADA networks or to reuse publicly available ones.  
Finally, proper attack models and scenarios, in which the attackers try to exploit 
vulnerabilities in cloud-based SCADA systems, should be developed. Building accurate and 
plausible threat models is a prerequisite to design secure architecture concepts. This is generally 
an open issue in SCADA security, while in the context of cloud-based SCADA, it has been 
explicitly recognized for the first time very recently [34].  
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4. EVOLUTION TOWARD FOG COMPUTING SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
4.1. Migration of SCADA Systems to Fog 
Fog computing essentially extends cloud computing and services to the edge of network. 
Consequently, end users, fog and cloud together form three-tier system architecture. 
Considering migration of SCADA system, a possible architecture is proposed in Fig. 4 
(based on [17]). 
The end users stratum corresponds to end user devices, e.g., field devices, smart 
energy meters, line sensors, etc. It can also include IIoT devices. 
The fog stratum encompasses one or more fog domains, managed by the same or 
different providers. Fog domain is constituted by the fog nodes, i.e., devices with computing, 
storage, and network connectivity. Examples of fog nodes are industrial controllers, 
switches, routers, embedded servers, etc. Fog nodes provide integration with cloud stratum, 
routing and switching, data storage and sharing, real-time analytics, outage management, 
controller functions (RTUs, PLCs, IEDs), wireless access, etc. The end users stratum and 
fog stratum are typically connected via wired or wireless local area networks (LANs). 
The cloud stratum is responsible for functions such as high level storage, utility billing 
system, demand prediction, high level processing and historical data analysis. The fog 
stratum and cloud stratum communicate via WAN connections. 
Table 2 is based on [5] and summarizes comparison of fog computing and cloud 
computing environments in the context of SCADA system requirements. 
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Fig. 4 Three-tier architecture of a fog-based SCADA system 
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Table 2 Fog computing vs. cloud computing in terms of SCADA requirements 
Feature Fog computing Cloud computing 
Architecture Decentralized (distributed) Centralized 
Communication Wired or wireless LAN IP WAN 
Number of server nodes Large Few 
Real-time operation Supported Supported 
Delay Low Relatively high 
Bandwidth cost Low Relatively high 
Security High Relatively high 
Mobility and location awareness Supported Limited 
4.2. Security Considerations 
With fog computing, security does not function in the cloud, but locally, thus using the 
same corporate IT policy, controls, and procedures as in traditional SCADA system. 
Inherently, there is opportunity to increase cyber security as compared to the cloud 
environment. Most fog nodes include a hardware root of trust [35], which represents a basis 
for protection chain from the field devices, through the fog stratum up to the cloud stratum. 
Traffic is supervised from the cloud to the distributed fog network, which can use different 
anomaly-based techniques to detect malicious activities in the local context. 
Security solutions for fog-based SCADA systems are generally similar to the ones 
applied for cloud-based SCADA. The emphasis is on the following techniques [20]: 
 Authentication. All messages and entities must be authenticated, which is particularly 
important to prevent MITM attacks. Different techniques can be applied, including 
public cryptography coupled with decoy technology, biometric authentication, etc. 
 Access control. All fog nodes should provide access control and ensure authorization, 
to protect operations such as reading or writing data, executing programs and 
controlling sensors/actuators. 
 Intrusion detection. Intrusion detection techniques are generally deployed within 
cloud environment to identify possible incidents, e.g., different types of cyber attacks, 
and violation of network security policies or standard security practices. In fog 
computing, intrusion detection systems can be implemented both on the client side 
and the fog network side thus allowing double protection, from insider attacks and 
attacks originating from the cloud. If a threat is detected, fog nodes block malicious 
traffic and protect the critical SCADA network. Highly-sensitive data can be 
processed locally without leaving the field site. 
 Privacy. Fog nodes are located close to, or at the field sites and collect more 
sensitive data compared to the cloud computing. For that reason, security techniques 
must ensure privacy for all field sites.  
Similar to the cloud environment, challenges in security provisioning of fog-based 
SCADA systems include further development of fog-specific security solutions, risk 
assessment methods, as well as dedicated test environments. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper provided a review of migration scenarios of SCADA systems toward cloud 
and fog environments with special attention to cyber security as a main operational risk 
factor, which requires additional research work and stipulates gradual migration. We have 
identified a progress in some areas, but also some open issues remain. 
First, public and private cloud architectures can both be the right selection for SCADA, 
but one size does not fit all. A proper risk analysis should be conducted to make right choice, 
and there is a strong need to develop appropriate risk assessment methods for that purpose. 
Taking into account the assessed risk, the cost increase is justified to provide secure cloud 
services. 
Second, proper testbeds should be developed to validate security solutions.  They include 
laboratory testbeds, but also research efforts to develop sophisticated hardware/software 
emulation platforms that are able to interact with the network. 
Finally, although evolution of SCADA toward fog computing environment is an 
emerging trend, which eliminates some of the problems inherent to the cloud, it is not 
risk-free by default. Besides an obvious need for security standards in the area, additional 
research work is needed to assess suitability of a complicated three-tier system for 
SCADA applications, regarding additional expenses and limited scalability. 
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